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Abstract: 
In this paper we explore the relation between bodies and selves evident in the 
narratives surrounding aesthetic surgery. In much feminist work on aesthetic surgery 
such narratives have been discussed in terms of the normalising consequences of the 
objectifying, homogenising, cosmetic gaze. These discussions stress the ways in 
which we model our bodies, under the gaze of others, in order to conform to social 
norms. Such an objectified body is contrasted with the subjective body; the body –for 
–the self. In this paper, however, we wish to make sense of the narratives surrounding 
such surgery by invoking the expressive body, which fits on neither side of this binary. 
We wish to explore how the modification of the body’s anatomical features 
(physiology) are taken to be a modification of its expressive possibilities, and 
therefore as modifications of possibilities for inter-subjective relations with others. It 
is such expressive possibilities, which, we suggest, underlie decisions to undergo 
surgical procedures. The possibility of modification of the expressive possibilities of 
the body, by the modification of its anatomical features, rests on the social 
imaginaries attached to anatomical features. In the context of such imaginaries 
individual decisions to undergo or promote surgery can be both intelligible and 
potentially empowering. However, the social consequences of such acts are an 
increasing normalisation of the ‘body under the knife’ and an intolerance of bodily 
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difference. This, we suggest, can only be changed by a re-visioning of bodily 
imaginaries so that expressive possibilities can be experienced across bodies with a 
range of physiological features. 
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In this paper we wish to explore the relation between bodies and selves evident in the 
narratives surrounding aesthetic surgery.i In much feminist work on aesthetic surgery 
such narratives have been discussed in terms of the normalising consequences of the 
objectifying, homogenising, cosmetic gaze (for example, Morgan, 1991; Bordo, 1993). 
These discussions stress the way in which we model ourselves, under the gaze of 
others, in order to conform to social norms. Luna Dozelal (2010: 357) argues:  
 
the experience of embodiment for most women, … is one of constant body 
visibility, where the body's appearance and comportment is self-consciously 
regarded as an object for a present or imagined third-person spectator. John 
Berger makes this point in his book Ways of Seeing, writing, “A woman must 
continually watch herself. She is almost continuously accompanied by her own 
image of herself ” (Berger, 1972: 46) […] Indeed, acceptance seems to be a 
basic […] drive in inter-subjective interaction. As a result of this drive for 
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acceptance, the individual feels the imperative to conform to prevailing social 
codes that dictate behaviour and appearance.  
 
Such an objectifying mode of relating to the body is often contrasted to what Gilles 
Deleuze (1987: 257), for example, characterises as a relation in which the question is 
what can bodies do rather than what do bodies look like.  
 
In this paper, however, we wish to make sense of the narratives surrounding such 
surgery not by recourse to a binary between the objectified body and the active body, 
(a binary we trace back to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir) but 
by invoking the expressive body, which fits on neither side of this binary.  We wish to 
explore how the modification of the body’s anatomical features (physiology) are 
taken to be a modification of its expressive possibilities, and therefore as 
modifications of possibilities for inter-subjective relations with others.  In this way we 
are in agreement with Ruth Holliday and Jacqueline Sanchez Taylor that the body is 
experienced as ‘a marker of who is valued and who is denigrated, who is included and 
excluded […], and the particular racialised, gendered, classed and age traits of each 
body [are] assumed to express the social position, intellectual ability, or sexual 
characteristics of the person in question’ (2006: 174). One way of putting this is to 
say that bodily anatomy is experienced in terms of an imaginary, which gives it an 
affective salience constituted out of its possibilities for social interaction (Gatens, 
1996; Lennon, 2004, 2015).  It is engagement with such imaginaries of the body that, 
we argue, informs the narratives of those undergoing such procedures.   
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While the primary purpose of this paper is to make sense of the practices of cosmetic 
surgery and explain why they can feel empowering to those who undertake them, we 
also acknowledge its problematic aspects. Such surgery is invasive and sometimes life 
threatening.  Although now consisting of a wide array of different practices, (Holliday 
and Sanchez-Taylor, 2006), it nonetheless offers a restricted range of desirable bodily 
shapes and features.  Crucially, it is reductive. The expressive characteristics of the 
body are frozen onto certain sets of physiological characteristics.  The indeterminate 
numbers of ways in which bodies can capture possibilities for inter-subjective 
variation are thereby lost. 
 
 
Aesthetic Surgery: the makeover 
 
In the UK, despite recent scandals about the safety of silicone in breast implants and 
the country teetering on recession, the number of aesthetic surgery operations has 
continued to rise, in line with trends elsewhere in the developed world. In 2015 over 
51,000 people in the UK had cosmetic surgery procedures in clinics registered with 
the British Association of Aesthetic and Plastic Surgeons alone; an increase of 13 per 
cent on the previous year (BAAPS, 2016). Inclusion within the statistics of non-
registered clinics, surgeries abroad, and excluded procedures (hair transplants, 
‘designer vagina’ surgery, and cosmetic dentistry, for example) would significantly 
increase numbers further (Holliday and Cairnie, 2007). If we add into the mix the 
number of non-surgical procedures performed (such as fillers), it is estimated that 
over 1.3 million people now undergo cosmetic work in the UK annually, creating a 
market worth over £2 billion.ii In 2015, within the surgical field, demand for 
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liposuctions was growing fastest in the UK (up over 20 per cent for both men and 
women on the previous year). However, for women the most prevalent procedures 
remained breast augmentations, and, for men, eyelid surgery and rhinoplasties, with 
anti-ageing procedures (such as facelifts) continuing to increase in popularity amongst 
both men and women (BAAPS, 2016). 
 
Early debates on aesthetic surgery focused on its use to reinforce oppressive power 
relations. Much early surgery was concerned with eradicating the body of certain 
‘ethnic’ features. It was used to change the shape of noses, or eyes, or to modify 
‘African’ features to produce bodies more closely approximating those of white 
colonisers. Such procedures were seen as a manifestation of power relations in a racist 
culture (Haiken, 1997; Gilman, 1999). Early feminist scholarship focused primarily 
on women in relation to aesthetic surgery, concerned with how the increasing 
pervasiveness of such surgery was entwined with the wider cultural objectification of 
women’s bodies (Morgan, 1991; Bordo, 1993).  Writers were interested in the matrix 
of material and cultural practices underpinning a beauty system that induced women 
to discipline their bodies in ever more invasive and risky ways. That women might 
undergo surgeries to modify their flesh for aesthetic purposes was seen as 
symptomatic of a patriarchal culture in which the control and subordination of women 
are, in part, exercised through such bodily regimes.  
 
Current discussions complicate this picture. Firstly came work stressing women’s 
agency in making decisions to undertake surgery. Kathy Davis’ 1995 work, although 
widely critiqued (Bordo, 2003; Fraser, 2003; Jones, 2008; Bordo, 2009; Holliday and 
Elfving-Hwang, 2012), was importantly one of the first (and still relatively few) in-
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depth studies to provide empirical data on how women felt about having cosmetic 
surgery. Davis, interviewing women before and after their surgery, concluded that, 
whilst women’s choices to undergo surgery and their post-surgery responses were 
complex, for many the surgery was a positive intervention. For many of the women, 
she concluded: ‘cosmetic surgery can be an understandable step in the context of an 
individual woman’s experience of embodiment and of her possibilities of taking 
action to alter her circumstances’ (1995: 163). Davis, and those discussing her work, 
did recognise that these decisions were being taken within a disciplinary culture in 
which certain bodily shapes are normalised, but the emphasis on the agency of those 
seeking the procedures marked a new direction within aesthetic surgery scholarship. 
 
Since the mid-1990s when Davis’ research was first published the world of aesthetic 
surgery has undergone rapid change. Medical and information technologies have 
developed at an astonishing pace, the range and availability of procedures have 
expanded, and aesthetic surgery has become ever more visible, mainstream, and 
normalised: ‘repositioned as something “normal” people could have, something you 
didn’t have to be psychologically compromised to desire’ (Jones, 2008: 25). Aesthetic 
surgery is no longer the preserve of the rich and famous but instead, as Cressida 
Heyes and Meredith Jones remark, is ‘increasingly marketed as an everyday option 
for ordinary women (and men), and its recipients cross lines of class, age, occupation, 
gender, and national context’ (2009: 8-9). Likewise scholarly research on aesthetic 
surgery has expanded beyond a focus overwhelmingly on women and the 
intersections between cosmetic surgery and patriarchal culture, or on race and the 
interrelations between surgery and racist culture, to analyses of the complex and 
multiple modes and locations in which aesthetic surgery is consumed. One key 
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development is the marketing and take-up of aesthetic surgery for men. In the UK 
industry statistics show that the number of men undertaking aesthetic surgery is 
increasing apace with women.  Whilst BAAPS statistics indicate that men currently 
make up nine per cent of all aesthetic surgery clients within their registered clinics 
(BAAPS, 2016), it is estimated by others that if one includes within the figures 
excluded surgeries (hair transplants, for example), as well as overseas and ‘unofficial’ 
surgeries, men constitute a higher overall proportion of aesthetic surgery clients 
(Holliday and Cairnie, 2007; Holliday and Elfving-Hwang, 2012). The marketing of 
aesthetic surgery to men and women emphasises physically distinct male and female 
bodies, with many popular procedures (breast enlargements for women, breast tissue 
reductions for men, buttock implants, chin reshaping) accentuating and normalising a 
particular corporeal inscription of sexed difference, and pathologising bodies that 
deviate from the prescribed norm.  
 
In this context, and more widely, those who undertake these practices are now 
regarded as consumers rather than patients; the body that ensues is a product to be 
purchased.  And within this broader milieu the meanings of certain practices of 
transformation have become unstable and changeable. In most recent scholarship on 
cosmetic surgery the emerging attention to issues of intersectionality (Heyes and 
Jones, 2009; Holliday and Elfving-Hwang, 2012) challenges recourse to easy 
equations of cosmetic surgery with sexism, or indeed racism. Ruth Holliday and 
Joanna Elfving-Hwang in their analysis of aesthetic surgery in Korea illustrate how 
‘foregrounding cosmetic surgery as only a feminine or culturally imperialist practice 
is a key weakness of the existing literature and produces only partial accounts of 
national cosmetic practices’ (2012: 60, italics in original). Aesthetic surgery in Korea, 
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they argue, cannot be reduced simply to an adherence to feminine beauty practices as 
this ignores the significant number of men undergoing cosmetic surgery in that 
country. Nor can it be reduced to attempts to westernise the Korean body, as this 
neglects not only the impact of Korean national identity and its specific geo-political 
and cultural history on ideas of the desirable body; it also reduces the analysis to just 
a selection of procedures (double eyelid surgery or breast augmentation for example), 
ignores other surgeries (cheekbone trimming for instance) and presents selective 
readings of those surgeries. Why should breast augmentation or eyelid surgery in 
Korea be read as ethnic cosmetic surgery when the same procedures are read as 
related to femininity and youthfulness in the west? Shirley Tate’s work on black 
beauty (2009) also complicates narratives by illustrating the indeterminacy, 
dynamism and fluidity of meaning, which can be attached to beauty practices. The 
young women she interviewed were creating specifically black identities, while using 
techniques (hair dye, hair straightening etc.), which had previously been taken to 
reflect the dominance of white beauty ideals. In her analysis these practices resist both 
the white ideals and those black ideals which insist on certain norms of appearance to 
express black political solidarity.  It is not that these contemporary practices operate 
without norms. Indeed, within certain communities (see especially Tate’s discussion 
of ‘browning’) the norms are very precise. Nonetheless, the practices have changed 
what kinds of bodies can manifest black identityiii.  
 
Despite such destabilisation there is, nonetheless, a notable convergence within and 
across cultural groupings concerning what constitutes a desirable body shape and 
arrangement of facial features. Alexander Edmonds (2010) notes, for example, how 
augmented breasts have become increasingly desirable within Brazil thereby 
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challenging the Brazilian ‘“biotype” […] a particular ideal of the female body that 
emphasized the buttocks, hips and thighs, and not the breasts’ (42). Aesthetic surgery 
is primarily about the erasure of bodily differences, and where differences from the 
norm occur these are increasingly pathologised.  Small breasts are constructed as the 
medical condition ‘micromastia’. Male fatty breast tissue is pathologised as 
‘gynocamastia’.  In terms of reconstructing faces, many US surgeons work with the 
guidelines for facial symmetry laid out in the book Proportions of the Aesthetic Face 
ensuring that surgically enhanced faces conform to a standardised formation of 
features (Powell and Humphreys, 1984). Websites advertising cosmetic surgery talk 
of ‘correcting’ various physical features, for example: ‘Correcting weak and 
unbalanced features’.iv  As ‘correcting’ means making right, by implication the body 
that needs correcting is defined as a wrong body.  Most of us then have the wrong 
bodies. At the very least as we grow older the body displays physical signs of aging, 
and we now have surgical procedures that aim to ‘correct’ the signs of aging. 
Aesthetic surgery therefore both reiterates and itself produces norms of what 
acceptable and desirable female and male bodies should look like. The noticeably 
augmented breast, for example, becomes a coveted body part in its own right 
(Economic and Social Research Council, 2015). Desirable and desired bodies 
conform increasingly to a very narrow range of body types (for women small straight 
noses, large firm breasts, flat stomachs, wrinkle free, lifted faces, for men angular 
chins, straight noses, flat stomachs, defined ‘pecs’ and so on). We look at ourselves 
and others with a cosmetic gaze, informed by the techniques, expectations and 
strategies of bodily modification; viewing bodies as awaiting improvement 
(Wegenstein and Ruck, 2011). 
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In accommodating the rapid changes in cosmetic surgery in the last decade much 
contemporary research emphasises its location within an overarching ‘makeover 
culture’ in which the self is a project continually to be worked on (Jones, 2008).  
Makeover shows such as 10 Years Younger and Extreme Make-Over (Jones, 2008; 
Weiss and Kukla, 2009) view aesthetic surgery as a central (and acceptable) mode of 
body transformation. No longer is the process of surgery something that is universally 
hidden, but instead, for many, it is something to be seen and celebrated. People post 
their cosmetic surgery journeys on youtube and write blogs recording their 
transformations (Heyes and Jones, 2009). In a culture which places value on ‘working 
on yourself’ and ‘not letting yourself go’, undertaking aesthetic surgery, and also 
making visible this engagement, signals an individual’s social status via conspicuous 
consumption. Surgery becomes akin to re-vamping your wardrobe, re-designing your 
house or garden; it has become another means to display social worth in a culture 
where ‘success is judged on the display of the never-ending renovation of self’ (Jones, 
2008: 12). 
 
Changing Selves 
 
Motivations to surgically change the body stem not simply from a desire for a 
different body, but from a desire for a reconfigured sense of self, to create, as Mike 
Featherstone suggests, ‘a renewed body and self, better able to move through 
interpersonal spaces and more able to enjoy the full range of lifestyle opportunities 
and pleasures on offer’ (2010: 196). As Davis remarks ‘cosmetic surgery is an 
intervention in identity […] by providing a woman with a different starting position, 
cosmetic surgery can open up the possibility to renegotiate her relationship to her 
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body and construct a different sense of self’ (Davis, 1995: 113). The marketing of 
procedures often celebrates surgery as a means to gain not just the body that you 
always wanted, but also, in so doing, the body that reflects the true ‘you’. In short, 
‘Repair the body or face and the self will be repaired’ (Featherstone, 2010: 205). 
 
A common narrative in adverts for surgery and in people’s stories of their reasons for 
undergoing cosmetic procedures is the notion of a disjuncture between an inner and 
outer self (Holliday and Cairnie, 2007).  Websites advertising surgery proclaim, for 
example:  ‘Sometimes the way we feel on the inside doesn’t reflect the way we look 
on the outside’.v Making the body look younger or thinner, larger or smaller breasted, 
is supposed to reflect either who we truly are or who we desire to be. As one woman 
noted after a tummy tuck and cosmetic dentistry: ‘I don’t mean to sound cheesy but 
[the clinic] has given me back the confidence which was hidden beneath a horrible (in 
my mind) exterior’vi. Here the pursuit of the hidden inner self is linked to the renewal 
of self worth. Edmond’s (2010) ethnography of Brazilian cosmetic surgery 
underscores the significance of narratives of self-esteem in justifications of surgery by 
both recipients and surgeons. His account of the Brazilian context illustrates how 
aesthetic surgery is presented as a type of ‘psychological healing’ (46); ‘a 
psychotherapeutic intervention worthy of being offered in a public health system to 
needy patients’ (49).  
 
What constitutes these new selves is, however, not just a more aesthetically pleasing 
body, but a modification of our relations with others. Sander Gilman in his early work 
on aesthetic surgery (1999) pointed out that the goal of such transformations was 
happiness (whether or not it was achieved). Bodily changes are interpreted as a route 
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to happiness because they were seen as ways in which the self became transformed by 
means of a transformation of its relations with others. Features dubbed abnormal were 
‘corrected’ or features which led to exclusion from a desired group were rendered less 
visible. So by looking younger, more western, healthier or more sexually attractive 
our inter-subjective relations were improved. Many writers have pointed out that 
physical appearance is treated as a measure of social worth (Gill et al., 2005; Elliott, 
2008; Atkinson, 2008). Holliday and Elfving-Hwang in their research on aesthetic 
surgery in South Korea note that decisions to undergo surgery are ‘perceived as a 
worthwhile and understandable investment in the body’ (2012: 61) – to secure a better 
job or more favourable marriage. Adverts for surgery in the UK often link women’s 
surgery to improved romantic and sexual success. For example, one clinic exclaims 
on their website that a client post-surgery ‘has a new figure, new man and a renewed 
love for life!’ vii  
 
To summarise: There is a widespread use of and normalisation of aesthetic surgery 
procedures, despite the surgery being invasive, painful, carrying risks and potentially 
having negative consequences and side effects. These procedures are no longer 
confined to women or women and men racialised as non-western. Moreover, although 
aesthetic procedures are located within a wider cultural sphere which is sexist, racist 
and ableist, and, in our view, continues to feed such prejudices; those undergoing 
surgery can no longer be seen simply as victims and dupes of patriarchal, racist and 
ableist norms. As noted above, aesthetic surgery is currently located within a 
makeover culture, marketed and consumed as an exercise in agency, in self -making. 
It is often sought and experienced as empowering and transformative.  Moreover the 
meaning carried by bodily transformations, like all meaning, is indeterminate and 
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subject to change. These bodily makeovers are presented, sought, and, sometimes, 
experienced, as transformations of self, which by consequence offer possibilities for 
enhanced social relations; either personal relations or relations in a wider sphere of 
work and public life. This situation is what we aim to make sense of, by moving 
beyond discourses of objectification to explore how the pursuit of aesthetic surgery is 
linked to the expressive body.  
 
Bodily Objectification 
 
As noted in the introduction, one way of making sense of these practices is via a 
distinction between the objective and the active body.  The distinction between the 
body as object and the active/intentional body, as self, has its origin in the work of 
Sartre and Beauvoir, who contrast an alienated relation to the body as object with a 
more authentic relation to the body, as that by which we engage with and respond to 
the world. Sartre (1969: 303-359) draws a distinction between the body as being -for 
–itself and the body as being-for others. The body as being-for itself is not 
encountered as an object, but as that by which the subject senses, perceives and acts. 
There is, also, however, our body as being-for-others. When we encounter the body of 
an other it is an object for us. To get a sense of our own bodies as objects, as having 
objective characteristics, we have to imagine ourselves as a body-for-the-Other: ‘the 
body-for-the-Other is the body-for-us, but … alienated’ (353).  For Sartre between 
this objective view and the (non- objective) body-for-self there is an irreconcilable 
gap.  In adopting the objective view we are necessarily standing in an alienated 
relation to our body, as something that is both our self and stands outside our self, ‘a 
thing outside my subjectivity…The experience of my alienation is made manifest in, 
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for example, shyness …the shy person …is vividly and consciously aware of his body 
not as it is for him, but as it is for the Other. This constant uneasiness, which is the 
apprehension of my body’s alienation is irremediable’ (353, italics in original).   
 
The most famous discussion of this as applied to gender relations is by Beauvoir in 
The Second Sex ([1949], 2010) when she argues girls are brought up to experience 
their bodies as objects to be disciplined into compliance with a predominantly visual 
norm. Girls’ relationship to their bodies is then, via internalising the gaze of others, a 
relationship of alienation of the kind Sartre describes: ‘the little girl pampers her doll 
and dresses her as she dreams of being dressed [...] she thinks of herself as a 
marvelous doll […] for the woman [...] she is taught that to please…she must make 
herself object […] she is treated like a living doll’ (304-5). This alienated relation to 
the body is contrasted by both Sartre and Beauvoir with a more authentic relation to it, 
in which our focus is the body for ourselves, the body that senses, perceives and acts; 
the body as that by which we engage in the world.  This authentic relation with the 
body-for-self is a sense of self as an embodied consciousness.  Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (2012) gives a detailed account of such bodily intentionality, in which the body 
as an ‘I can’ is the primordial mode of experiencing our body’s existence (Part I, III).   
For Beauvoir this more authentic relation to the body was one which was made 
available to boys, but which girls had to struggle to achieve: ‘the great advantage for 
the boy [is his] free movement towards the world ... climbing trees, fighting with his 
companions … he grasps his body as a way of dominating nature and as a fighting 
tool’ (2010: 305).viii  
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Sartre’s and Beauvoir’s accounts of the ways we live our relation to our bodies as 
objectified and thus as alienated, is therefore one of the ways in which we experience 
our body, our body under the gaze of others, and under our own self-critical gaze 
when internalising the gaze of the other.  And it certainly seems to be in play when 
considering aesthetic surgery. For one way of seeing our relation to our bodies in 
relation to such surgery is an attempt to produce the body as a particular kind of 
object, one that conforms to some desired prototype. We are producing a body in 
terms of how it appears in a mirror or under the gaze of another (the trend of posting 
‘selfies’ on social media sites is one way in which young people especially are 
manifesting the gaze contemporarily).  For Beauvoir, to prioritise this relationship to 
our body is an inauthentic mode of relating to it, treating it like an object, reorganising 
its features in the same way in which we might arrange a room, and treating its 
relation to the self as no different from the way the room or table is related to the self. 
The body here is an object outside the self, which we arrange in certain ways, the 
makeover of the body echoing the makeovers of our houses and gardens. This 
framework seems to both explain some of what is going on with aesthetic surgery and 
to some extent what is wrong with it. People think of perfecting their bodies as a way 
of improving themselves, and making themselves happier.  But while transformation 
of the self is sought, it is the body as object, which is modified; and, on this account, 
this body is alienated from the self. To treat the objectified body as the self is 
therefore to be fundamentally mistaken. Consequently changes in the objectified body 
are not necessarily matched by the desired transformation of the self. As Davis’ 
(1995) research indicates, some women find greater happiness and self-fulfilment 
through their surgery but others do not.  
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The Expressive Body 
 
We accept that the concept of bodily objectification can be helpful in highlighting and 
making sense of some aspects of our relations to our body.  We, nonetheless, argue 
that it fails to capture something that is central to practices of bodily modification, 
namely, the body as expressive. Attention to the expressive nature of the body crosses 
over the binary between the body for the self, and the body-for-others and 
problematises the contrast between authentic and inauthentic relations to the body. 
For the expressive body has a shared salience for both the self and others whom that 
embodied self encounters.  
 
To make sense of narratives of bodily modification we need to recognise that the 
bodies of ourselves, and those of others, are experienced, not just as objects to be 
aesthetically improved in accordance with some cultural norm, but also as expressive 
of subjectivity. Expressive bodies tell us how things are with a person, whether they 
are anxious or exuberant, relaxed or watchful, whether they want company or want to 
be left alone. But they also tell us about the positions of those bodies in a wider social 
sphere, whether they are masculine or feminine, young or old, sexually attractive or 
not. Expressive bodies prompt particular kinds of responses from others. We respond 
to others in terms of what we take their bodies to be expressing. Surgically re-shaped 
bodies may be desirable because they express a different kind of positionality, and 
this involves a responsive recognition from others that facilitates a different set of 
inter-subjective relations.  What is wanted is a body able to produce particular 
affective responses in others, and therefore a body in social space; a modification of 
the embodied self’s lived relations with others.  As Holliday and Sanchez suggest: 
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‘Bodies [are] carefully managed in order to be read as appropriate for social contact. 
Dress is one mechanism for achieving this aim […] but increasingly aesthetic surgery 
is being used to enhance people’s chances of participation in the public sphere’ (2006: 
183). 
 
The expressive body, whether our own or that of others, is grasped by means of a 
corporeal image. To experience a body as expressive is to see it as having a certain 
form or organisation, it is to have an image of it, an image which prompts a response 
of our own (Lennon, 2006, 2015).  Expressive bodies are material bodies whose 
experienced shape or form carries expressive content. These are bodies viewed in a 
certain kind of way, as positioned in inter-subjective interaction. The corporeal image 
here is not an inner representation of the body, something like a mental picture. It is 
rather the way in which the body is experienced, as having a certain shape or form.  
Both Merleau- Ponty ([1945] 2012) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1967) stressed the way 
in which our subjectivity is manifest on our bodies, emphasising the direct availability 
of expressive content. Thus Wittgenstein states: ‘consciousness in the face of another. 
Look into someone else’s face and see the consciousness in it, and also a particular 
shade of consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest, excitement, 
dullness etc.; the light in the face of another’ (1967:  225).  Similarly, Merleau-Ponty 
remarks: ‘Faced with an angry or threatening gesture…I read anger in it. The gesture 
does not make me think of anger, it is anger itself’ (2012: 190). This direct awareness 
of the expressive character of bodies requires inter-subjectivity.  It requires a 
responsiveness from/to others. But what we do not have is a gap between the body- 
for -self and body- for- others. These are interdependent. The sense of myself-for-
others is interwoven into my subjective sense of my bodily corporeality, and my sense 
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of other bodies for myself.  I am aware of the bodies of others as expressive and 
suggesting/requiring responses from me, and I am, interdependently, aware of my 
own body as expressive and suggesting and requiring responses from them.  
 
The bodies of ourselves and others are, then, experienced as having a certain form 
which positions those bodies in interpersonal and social space. Such positionality is 
experienced as immediately evident and enables, without reflection, our own 
responses to them. What this amounts to is that we are aware of certain physiological 
features in terms of their interpersonal and social significance. We 
perceive/experience certain bodily shapes directly as requiring/suggesting responses 
of our own or others. The phenomenology here is crucial. There is no two-stage 
process by which we detect a materiality and infer social significance, or go through a 
process of interpretation to assign such significance. Rather the significance is part of 
our immediate experience of the bodies of others and ourselves.  In this way social 
relations shape our experience of corporeality. The bodies we encounter are ‘cultural 
–biological, […] always already physical and social’ (Zeiler, 2013: 58). 
 
It is crucial to note here that the awareness of the body in terms of its expressive 
features is not simply an awareness of anatomy.  So Wittgenstein says: ‘descriptions 
of facial expressions’ do not consist ‘in giving the measurements of the face’ (Kenny, 
2005: 221). Think of our recognition of a face as ‘lighting up’ and the impossibility of 
capturing this expressive feature by detailing the physiological changes it involves.  
‘“Similar expression” takes faces together in a quite different way from “similar 
anatomy”’ (Kenny, 2005: 221). One may note an alteration in a face and describe it 
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by saying that the face assumed a harder expression –and yet not be able to describe 
the alteration in spatial terms.  
 
Nonetheless expressive features do not float free of physiology either. This is because 
we experience certain physiological features as expressive. They are experienced by 
members of the relevant social grouping immediately and directly as carrying 
significance, social possibilities, in the way that a smile carries joy. Our relations with 
others are mediated by imaginaries, which inform the ways in which we immediately 
experience particular bodily shapes (Gatens, 1996; Lennon 2004, 2006, 2015).  
Certain physiologies carry an imaginary of desirability.  Other bits of anatomy are 
invested with an imaginary of youthful energy and charm.  And some (the drooping of 
the corners of the mouth, for example) carry sadness and decline. It is because we 
experience bodies as expressive, because physiology carries with it an immediate 
salience, positioning us within certain patterns of social encounter, that people wish to 
modify such physiology when they want to engage in different social practices in 
relation to others. This can be seen if we look at the reasons people give for 
undertaking surgery, at the way certain procedures are marketed, and at the 
descriptions that people give of their bodily features, whether or not they resort to 
surgery.   
 
The ways in which physiological features are expressive can be manifested variously. 
For example, in South Korea traditional beliefs that a person’s character can be 
deduced from physical, including facial, appearance still has resonance today. 
Holliday and Elfving-Hwang suggest: ‘Around half of all Koreans believe that one 
can ‘read’ a person’s character by looking at their faces […]’ (2012: 70). Certain 
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physiologies are seen as expressive of power and authority. Linda Alcoff highlights 
Richard Rodriguez’s self-reflection in his book Days of Obligation:  
 
I used to stare at the Indian in the mirror. The wide nostrils ... the thick lips ... 
Such a long face - such a long nose - sculpted by indifferent, blunt thumbs, 
and of such common clay. No one in my family had a face as dark or as Indian 
as mine. My face could not portray the ambition I brought to it  (2006: 191, 
italics original).  
 
Certain anatomies are seen as more sexually desirable than others. Beauvoir (1965) 
contemplating her aging appearance comments:  ‘I loathe my appearance now; the 
eyebrow slipping down towards the eyes … that air of sadness around the mouth that 
wrinkles always bring … never again. Never again shall I collapse, drunk with fatigue 
into the small of hay … Never again a man … never feeling any new desires … not 
my body alone but my imagination  ... has accepted that’ (1965: 671-675).  Body fat 
is consistently viewed as manifesting laziness, greed, and lack of willpower. The 
slender body, in contrast, depicts control and self-containment, and of course, sexual 
desirability (Bordo, 1993; Orbach, 2009).  
 
The expressive character of the body is, to be sure, not simply a matter of a static 
physiological form. It is a character that emerges over time, incorporating changing 
patterns of movement. And there is some recognition of this in the makeover 
programmes; not only is surgery required, but also training in movement, response 
and so on, if the desired effect is to be achieved. But this does not alter the most 
important point.  It is because our relations with others are mediated by the social 
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imaginaries relating to the particular bodily shapes that are immediately experienced, 
that individual decisions to change these shapes can seem not only comprehensible 
but also rational in the context of an inter-corporeality in which our bodily features 
are experienced also by ourselves as laying out certain possibilities for us - for our 
projects and interactions commonly require a body which expresses to oneself and 
others the positionality which is aspired to (See Lennon, 2006 for a discussion of this 
point in relation to transsexual surgery).ix 
 
Changing Expressive Possibilities 
 
However intelligible they are, if we step back and look at the consequences of these 
individual decisions, we see a widespread pathologisation of bodily difference. Our 
experience of the expressive possibilities of our own bodies and those of others is 
increasingly molded by an imaginary, which is now informed in a central way by 
cosmetically (as well as digitally) modified bodies. In this climate it becomes less 
possible to see expressive possibilities across a range of anatomies. It is a climate in 
which it can seem appropriate for parents of Down’s syndrome children to resort to 
surgery to have their distinctive features changed, so that the social responses of 
others to them open up a different range of possibilities for social interaction than 
those currently in play.  What has happened here is, increasingly, a reduction of the 
expressive possibilities of the body to a narrow range of physiological manifestations.  
Cosmetic surgery is not the whole but a significant part of such a reduction.  Let us 
return to the example of a face ‘lighting up’.  It would be as if, increasingly, a face 
could only be recognised as lighting up if a particular range of movements were 
manifest. The other possibilities are lost.  While this has not yet happened for this 
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expressive character, it is what is increasingly happening for expressions of 
desirability, intelligence, ambition, potency, and indeed femininity and masculinity. 
Jones (2013) in her discussion of the photo-shopping of nude images of Simone de 
Beauvoir, makes an interestingly parallel point.  Maybe the tidying up of the image 
was needed for us now, with our norms informed by digital enhancement, to recognise 
the image as that of an attractive and desirable woman.  In the 1950s the unenhanced 
body would have immediately had that resonance.x  Digital modifications as well as 
surgical ones have structured the imaginaries which mediate our perceptual 
encounters with bodies. ‘The message may not be that de Beauvoir’s body is not 
‘good enough’ but that she is here being actively visually incorporated into the 
aesthetic value system of the contemporary world’ (Jones, 2013: 25).  
 
To counter this situation requires a change of social imaginaries,xi so that a range of 
expressive possibilities, possibilities of inter-subjective encounters, can be 
experienced across bodies, which are anatomically much more diverse. We need a 
more indeterminate relation between anatomy and expressive force, so that sexual 
attractiveness, charm, authority, effectiveness, warmth and energy (and indeed 
femininity and masculinity) can be experienced across many different kinds of bodies.  
But, as Alcoff (2006) and Moira Gatens (1996) have pointed out, patterns of 
perception commonly operate below the level of reflective scrutiny and are difficult to 
dislodge by explicit reflection. Any such re-imagining must involve altering the 
perceptual sensitivity which we have to our own bodies and the bodies of others, a 
modification which goes hand in hand with change in the sets of inter-subjective 
interactions which it is possible for us to imagine engaging in.  We have to learn to 
perceive different patterns of significance in the bodies we encounter.  
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As noted above, Wittgenstein was anxious to distinguish classifications based on 
expressive content from classifications in terms of physiology. He stressed how the 
detection of joy, for example, was not to do with the measurements of the face. What 
Wittgenstein is at pains to stress is that expressive features have a certain autonomy 
from anatomical ones.xii We can develop this thought if we consider living with 
someone whose facial muscles have suffered paralysis. We may, at first, be unable to 
detect emotion in this face; or we may respond to it as though it is expressing some 
untold terror. Living closely alongside such a face, however, we come to grasp what 
range of movement there is as expressive of pain or joy. We perceive the corporeal 
features in a way which is continuous with our perception of joy in physically very 
diverse faces. The way the face is experienced by us comes to take a different shape, 
one in which the flicker of the eyelashes or the movement of one side of the mouth 
become the salient features.  
 
Such changed perceptual sensitivity is what is needed for bodies whose social 
positionality is now experienced in problematic ways. We need to change our 
perception of the expressive possibilities of such bodies, change the imaginaries we 
associate with them. xiii The changing of imaginaries is a creative act. And for this, of 
course, we need specific interventions in the publically visible realm. Changing social 
imaginaries is complex but not impossible. We need, for example, to see the way an 
aging body can be shaped for possibilities of interaction with the world and others, 
and not simply as expressive of decline and dependence. The videos of Matisse, in his 
wheelchair, revolutionising art with his cut outs, are helpful here (Tate Modern, 2014; 
MOMA, 2015).  The insistence on the need for visibility of manifestly old (and 
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female) faces as television presenters is also part of such a change. Paralympic sport, 
particularly the high profile of the 2012 Paralympic Games, significantly changed the 
imaginaries surrounding bodies previously imagined as simply not able.  The 
changing of imaginaries is part of a destabilisation of currently circulating meanings. 
To change imaginaries is to change the expressive possibilities certain kinds of 
anatomy carry for us.  It is to alter their expressive impact. And the consequences are 
often unpredictable. We might have hoped that having Obama as US President would 
change the way a black male face was experienced. However, in the light of many 
recent shootings of black men in the US, such a face, particularly if borne by a young 
man, still expresses criminality to certain white sections (to name just two instances, 
the shooting of Travyon Martin in Miami, Flordia in 2012; and the shooting of 
Michael Brown, Ferguson, St. Louis in 2014).  If we had a Native American US 
President would this change things for Rodriguez and his desire that his face could 
capture his ambition (as detailed above; Alcoff, 2006: 191)? What would be required 
is that we can view such a face and see it as potentially authoritative.  Changing the 
expressive impact of bodily forms can happen as a result of high profile role models, 
but also as a result of changes in everyday practices.  Encountering women in the 
boardroom, black professors in philosophy seminars, differently-abled bodies in 
sexual relations, and every kind of body in social relationships, shifts our perceptual 
responses, and the potential such bodies express for us. Alcoff remarks that 
‘perceptual practices are dynamic even when congealed into habit’ (2006:191), and to 
re-imagine our bodies is to re-imagine possibilities for our inter-subjective practices 
in relation to a shared social world.  It is what is needed if the expressive possibilities 
of multiple bodies are not to be frozen by the dominance of ever more restricted 
norms. 
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Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have suggested that we make sense of certain practices of bodily 
modification, including aesthetic surgery, not in terms of a binary between an 
objectified body from which the self is alienated, and an active body to which the self 
has a more authentic relation; but instead in terms of the category of the expressive 
body; which is the body for self and for others. The expressive body is a body in 
which the bodily anatomy is experienced in terms of an imaginary, which locates that 
body within inter-subjective practices. Where that position is deemed unsatisfactory 
bodily modification is desired.  Those buying into aesthetic surgery are not 
necessarily mistaken about the inter-subjective changes it may facilitate. Nonetheless 
the widespread normalisation of such interventions narrows the range of anatomies, 
which enable desirable expressive social interactions, and freezes expressive 
possibilities to a limited range of anatomical features.  Aesthetic surgery, as currently 
practiced, restricts our perception of the expressive possibilities of bodies, and, 
thereby, the possibilities of social interaction.  Our perceptions are increasingly 
conditioned by a cosmetic gaze, in which, despite Wittgenstein’s protestations, 
expressivity is reduced to the measurements of the face or body.  To counter such 
reductions, and to expand our expressive inter-subjective encounters across a wider 
range of physiologies, takes innovations of a different kind from that of the surgeon’s 
knife.  
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Notes  
                                                        
i Following Holliday and Sanchez Taylor (2006), we will, in the main, use the term ‘aesthetic’ surgery 
rather than cosmetic surgery to refer to surgery which is performed to aesthetically enhance the body 
(in contrast to rehabilitative or reconstructive surgery which is surgery performed to reconstruct bodies 
in response to trauma or congenital defect).   
ii See: http://www.mintel.com/press-centre/beauty-and-personal-care/non-surgical-cosmetic-
procedures-top-the-million-mark-for-first-time 
iii See also the Feminist Theory (August 2013 14(2)) Special Issue ‘Beauty, race and feminist theory in 
Latin America and the Caribbean’ for discussions of the intersections of race and beauty in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, introduced by Monica G. Moreno Figueroa and Megan Rivers-Moore 
(2013). 
iv Retrieved from: https://www.harleymedical.co.uk/cosmetic-surgery-for-men/the-face/chin-implants  
v Retrieved from: http://www.transforminglives.co.uk/surgical/face-procedures/facelift-surgery/  
vi Retrieved from: www.revitaizeinturkey.com/testimonials-cosemtic-surgery-dentistry/ 
vii Retrieved from http://www.harleymedicalgroup.co.uk  
viii Now, of course, the objectifying gaze is one which boys/men can also experience. And there is 
much more emphasis on girls and women going to the gym or engaging in sporting activities (though 
often as a route to a more attractive body). 
ix Sometimes procedures are only explicitly noticeable to those who have them but for them their sense 
of their bodies’ possibilities have been changed.  
x Of course the main problem with these images, published on the front of Le Nouvel Observateur to 
celebrate what would have has been De Beauvoir’s 100th birthday, is that the celebration of a female 
philosopher and novelist is done by means of a nude image. 
xi It is not a question here of freeing our perceptual encounters from imaginaries. They provide us with 
the texture of perception (Lennon, 2015). Rather, as Meredith Jones points out, ‘every image is both 
physically and metaphorically “framed”—constructing its narrative through processes of inclusion and 
omission. Thus, image-making becomes a profoundly political act’ (2013: 20) 
xii Here Wittgenstein seems to be in direct conversation with those pedlars of Aryan physiology for 
whom such measurements were crucial; the social possibilities of the face determined by a system of 
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codified equivalences. But, of course, such measurements and codified equivalences also inform 
practices of cosmetic surgery.  
xiii It is what Luce Irigaray (1985) was attempting with her re-imaginings of the female body. See 
discussion in Alsop, Fitzsimons and Lennon (2002), Chapter 7.  
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